This paper provides a critical examination of the widely disseminated view that innovation in all or most activities is favoured by certain common characteristics in the local 'milieu', involving a cluster of many small firms benefiting from flexible inter-firm alliances, supported by mutual information exchanges of both an informal and formal nature. The general applicability of this model, and the localness of crucial linkages, is questioned initially on the basis of a review of different hypotheses about the geography of innovation. Moreover, examination of new survey evidence from a large number of firms in the London conurbation suggests that the importance of specifically local informal information spillovers for successful innovation is very much more limited than has been suggested, as are the supposed advantages of firm smallness.
Introduction
Over recent years, the topic of innovation has received growing attention from urban and regional analysts. This has been linked with a generally renewed interest in agglomeration economies, on the part of both economists (Krugman, 1991) and business analysts (Porter, 1990) . The particular significance for analyses of the geography of innovation lies in a longstanding emphasis on the role played by agglomeration economies in fostering localized learning processes within the economy (Glaeser, 1999) . The benefits are generally assumed to include the genesis of new products and processes, with their initial development being facilitated by geographical proximity (Saxenian, 1994) . These are crucial elements in the quality-based competition argued by Porter (1990) to have become the key to national and regional advantage.
Another factor in the recent renewal of interest in the regional dimension of innovation in regional development has been the strong performance over the last quarter of a century of a few key industrial clusters, the so called 'new industrial areas' (Scott, 1988) , which appeared to spawn a high degree of industrial innovations-including Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994) , the Southern California electronics industry, and the Emiglia-Romagna region of Italy (Scott, 1993) , the Baden W€ u urttemburg region of Germany (Strambach et al., 2001 ) and the science-based industrial cluster around Cambridge, England (Castells and Hall, 1994) . These clusters were seen to be characterized by a large number of small to medium sized firms, generating a range of new products with relatively short product life-cycles (in Vernon's 1966 terms) . The clusters are focused in different degrees on the development of 'hi-tech' products and/or the technological upgrading of craft activities. In these cases smallness was argued to provide flexibility in firms' relations with each other, maximizing their ability to form appropriate alliances for each particular project (Saxenian, 1994) .
The combination of the revival of academic interest in innovation and agglomeration, with the reported successes of these clusters led many commentators to advocate cluster-based regional planning policies. These sought to foster innovation and growth, by promoting local concentrations of generally small member firms, encouraged to engage in mutual information exchanges (both formal and informal) and develop a potential for very flexible kinds of inter-firm alliance. Proponents of this approach argued that this particular form of industrial organization provided the optimal environment for localized innovation and growth (Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999) .
1 However, much of this hypothesized role for regional planning in encouraging local innovation and growth in this context is based on the behaviour of an idealized type of industrial cluster, characterized as an 'innovative milieu' (Aydalot and Keeble, 1988) . From the point of view of innovation theory, there is actually no inherent reason why this particular relationship between geography and industrial organization should be generally superior to alternative arrangements. Rather theory suggests that that quite different forms of spatial and institutional arrangements may be appropriate for innovation in different kinds of business. Indeed we would argue that attempts to find any single 'ideal' model of firmindustry-geography organization that would maximize innovation involve a misunderstanding of essential features of the innovation process.
The aim of this paper is to outline a set of hypotheses and alternative models from main strands in the literature relating geography to innovation, and then to provide a limited test of these hypotheses in relation to the particular case of the London region. In particular, we focus on how well (or otherwise) expectations generated by some of the literatures relating to types of phenomena reported in 'new industrial areas' stand up in the context of the UK's most innovative region.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we start by considering the nature of innovation itself, and this allows us to develop a general definition of innovation which will be employed in our subsequent empirical analysis. In Section 3, we then review the various hypotheses which exist in the literature concerning the relationship between innovation and geography. Sections 4 and 5 provide the background to our case study, the London regional economy. Section 4 reviews the current aggregate evidence available about the patterns and sources of innovation in the London region, and Section 5 provides a broad analysis of innovation within London from the 1996 London Employers' Survey. Section 6 reports the results from a multinomial logit analysis of the 1996 and 1999 London Employers' Surveys, and Section 7 puts this in a broader inter-regional context, using comparative data from the 1997 national CSME survey. Section 8 provides some conclusions. Our analysis will be seen to provide little or no support for any role played by new industrial areas type phenomena in determining the UK geography of innovation. Rather, it suggests that in the case of the London region at least, standard agglomeration arguments appear to provide the best explanation of innovation dynamics.
The nature of innovation
Defining innovation is itself a difficult problem. The reason is that the term 'innovation' is frequently used in a variety of ways and contexts, many of which overlap and some of which are rather contradictory.
Innovation is different from pure invention. Innovation involves the successful implementation of a new product, service, or process, which for most activities entails their commercial success. Distinguishing between product and process innovations is also a problem, in that one often leads to the other, and one firm's new product is another's new process. New processes can allow new products to be developed, while mass production of successful new products often requires process innovation. Also, new products, when they are consumed either as factor inputs or intermediate goods, can contribute to changes in the way other products are produced. Both sets of interactions on face value can be defined as innovations. The problems of distinguishing between product and process innovations therefore also lead to problems of interpreting innovation within an orthodox microeconomic framework. Identifying whether innovations are due simply to factor allocation changes within existing production functional relationships, or alternatively due to changes in the production functions themselves can be problematic (Morroni, 1992) . Similarly, innovations may involve either or both price and non-price quality competition (Koutsoyiannis, 1982) . Understanding the effects of innovation on market equilibrium conditions requires identifying the specific effects of innovation on both production function and price competition relationships (Beath and Katsoulacos, 1991) , because market outcomes will differ according to exactly how any particular innovation is manifested.
Identifying the sources of innovation is another difficult problem. Some strands of research have focused on the nature and behaviour of the entrepreneur (Casson, 1982) , and investigated the extent to which entrepreneurial activities contribute to, or are dependent on, an innovative industrial environment. Other research has focused on the nature of the individual firm within an evolutionary, behavioural, and organizational context (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . Processes of inter-firm competition, learning, and imitation, may lead to periods of rapid innovation which lead to fundamental changes in the nature of economic activity (Solomou, 1990 ) of a type first identified by Schumpeter (1934) . However, both the origins and impacts of such innovations may be quite different between industrial sectors, geographical areas and time periods (Piore and Sabel, 1984) . It is this heterogeneity of sources and outcomes which makes innovation difficult to identify and analyse (Dosi, 1988) .
Although the nature, sources, and impacts of innovation are difficult to isolate, on the basis of these arguments there are three common features of all innovation which are identifiable; these are newness, improvement, and the overcoming of uncertainty.
Innovations are by definition new changes in either or both the technical and technological relationships of a firm (Morroni, 1992) . An innovation will therefore alter the potential set of alternative blueprints (Stoneman, 1983) available to a firm defining how a particular activity may be carried out. However, an increase in the number of alternative blueprints defining an activity is not of itself usually deemed to constitute an innovation. The reason is that the new blueprint must also be demonstrated to be superior to the existing alternatives. Exactly, how blueprints are demonstrated to be an improvement is a problem in its own right, and from a spatial point of view is a crucial issue. Although, as we have seen, identifying the source of innovation is both difficult and beyond the objective of this paper, the process of verification of the superiority of a new blueprint can in some circumstances be related to geography. We will discuss this issue in detail shortly. The final common feature of all innovations is that they involve facing and the overcoming of uncertainty, i.e. situations to which past experience seems to provide an inadequate guide, even as to the risks involved.
2 Beyond the exercise of imagination, and the willingness to move outside established routines and heuristics, this task requires ways of establishing a new order, and transforming situations of uncertainty into more calculable, manageable, and insurable situations of risk. In this respect also, we will argue that geography can play a role in facilitating (or hindering) the innovation process.
This tri-partite definition of innovation as being any commercial activity which exhibits the simultaneous characteristics of newness, improvement, and uncertainty, provides the basis of our subsequent empirical analysis of innovation which we under take in this paper. It is a much broader definition of innovation than is employed in much of the patent citation (Jaffe et al., 1993) or R&D literature (Acs, 2002) . However, the advantages of this particular definition of innovation are twofold. Firstly, it can be applied equally to product or process innovations, and secondly, it can be applied to any industrial sector, irrespective of the levels of technology employed. It is this particular definition of innovation which we employ in our empirical Sections 4 to 7, because this allows the surveyed firms themselves to identify whether an innovation has taken place.
On the basis of this definition of innovation, we are also now able to explain the various alternative hypotheses which exist in the literature concerning the relationship between innovation and geography.
Hypotheses about the geography of innovation
From the consideration of the economic nature of innovation the literatures on industrial organization, and on the geography of information and growth, various hypotheses have been developed to account for the widely observed uneven spatial distribution of innovative behaviour (Sternberg, 1996) . At a rather broader level they can be seen to involve four quite distinct sorts of approach to explaining that geography. The first two of these hypotheses stem from the well known product cycle model of Vernon (1966) , while the third stems from the Alchian (1957) analysis of the interaction between agents and their environments (Gordon and McCann, 2004) . The fourth hypotheses derives from more recent cluster and innovative milieux models.
Hypothesis 1: The contemporary geography of innovation is essentially a geography of the currently more innovative sectors of the economy.
This hypothesis takes off from the observation that in any period there are some sectors of economic activity which will be more heavily involved in innovation of products or processes than others. This may be because of the particular phase which has been reached in the life cycle of their product set, or because some activities with very short product cycles are more or less permanently locked into the innovative phase. If each of these industries is subject to rather different location factors, because of the nature of their production technologies and/or of marketing/consumption process, the geography of innovation may then be reducible simply to a geography of industrial location. With activities remaining in the same broad locations through all of the phases of the product cycle, places which they dominate will also appear to move through that cycle, except for the homes of the permanent innovators, which would remain continuing sites of innovation.
Hypothesis 2: The contemporary geography of innovation is essentially a result of spatial differences in the phases of product or profit cycles.
This alternative interpretation of the product cycle geographies emphasises significant and typical shifts in the locational requirements between the phases of an industry's product or profit cycle. In particular, Markusen (1985) has explored the spatial implications of qualitatively changed conditions of production and demand during the course of the cycle, emphasizing the particular role of agglomeration economies during the innovative phases of an industry's product cycle. From this perspective, during these early innovative phases, neither the scale of production nor the certainty of growth are sufficient for firms to attempt self-sufficiency either in production or training, while design uncertainties also militate against reliance on either distant suppliers or semi-skilled labour. In this early phase, access to appropriate skills and sub-contractors are a crucial condition for successful innovation and the management of uncertainties. Later on, in the mature phases of the cycle, when output scale has been achieved, production methods have become routinized, and cost factors are increasingly important, both simple geographical dispersal to lower cost locations and the spatial division of labour will become increasingly relevant.
3 From this perspective, therefore, what is generally significant about the geography of innovative activities is not the distribution of creative or inventive potential, but the production conditions which allow infant firms and industries to survive and thrive in a nursery environment, until they acquire the scale and experience to strike out on their own. 4 In terms of the assumptions underlying the relationship between innovation and geography, there is a fundamental difference here between the first and the second hypotheses, both of which are developed on the basis of the product-cycle model. The first hypothesis works on the assumption that as innovation takes place, the innovating firms are primarily static in terms of their location behaviour, such that different phases of the product-cycle are not reflected in changing industrial geographies.
On the other hand, the second hypothesis works on the assumption that the innovating firms are largely dynamic in terms of their location behaviour, such that the different phases of the product-cycles are indeed reflected in terms of evolving industrial geographies.
Hypothesis 3: The contemporary geography of innovation is essentially the outcome of variations in the characteristics between different places which lead to differences in the geography of creativity and entrepreneurship.
This third approach to understanding the distribution of innovative activity focuses on the geography of creativity and entrepreneurship, in the sense of place characteristics favouring the development and commercial launching of potentially successful new or improved products, either through established or new business organizations. The emphasis here is on the factors which stimulate and enable novel developments while also facilitating the selection of those with real competitive potential. The three key sets of factors involve:
(i) a rich 'soup' of skills, ideas, technologies, and cultures within which new compounds and forms of life can emerge; (ii) a permissive environment enabling unconventional initiatives to be brought to the marketplace; and (iii) vigorously competitive and critical arenas operating selection criteria which anticipate (and/or shape) those of wider future markets.
In some circumstances, particularly when the driver is patentable scientific knowledge which can be profitably produced and exploited in-house, the relevant environment may be primarily that of a global business corporation. More typically it is likely to be a place (locale, city, or region) with the 'unique buzz, unique fizz (and) special kind of energy' coupled with discretionary spending power, which Hall (1998, p.963) sees as the critical magnets.
Two aspects of this fertile environment highlighted by Chinitz (1961) in his classic comparison of New York and Pittsburgh are the minimal requirement that new enterprises can combine relevant technical and market expertise, and the lower likelihood of meeting this in an urban economy dominated by large bureaucratic businesses. From a different perspective, Porter (1990) also highlights some of these factors in arguing for the importance of both a discriminating local market and rivalry among local producers within a particular sector as spurs to quality improvements in their goods or services.
This fourth approach to explaining the uneven geographical patterns of innovation involves another type of 'milieu' argument, which is focused on the geography of co-operation. This rests on the perception that innovation is most likely to occur in small and medium-sized enterprises, which have neither the scale nor the risk-bearing capacity to provide all of the key inputs on their own account. Observations from so-called 'new industrial districts' (Scott, 1988) such as Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994) and the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy (Scott, 1988; Castells and Hall, 1994) have suggested that the geographical proximity of SMEs is a necessary criterion for the development of mutual trust relations based on a shared experience of interaction with decisionmaking agents in different firms. In these contexts, the social network model (Granovetter, 1973) has highlighted the role of social as well as purely instrumental business links. This emphasis on small firms may be questioned, and a line of argument going back to Schumpeter (1942) has pointed to the crucial role in modern times of big firms' R&D. However, among smaller firms it is still an important fact that they are particularly reliant on external economies of agglomeration as a substitute for internal economies of scale. Where active risk-sharing is involved, however, pure agglomeration of self-interested individuals does not ensure the relations of trust and restraints on opportunistic behaviour, required when contracts and market flexibility offer inadequate protection for agents' interests. Trust of this kind requires a combination of inside information about competences and dispositions, about whose capacities can be relied on or not, and forms of social control which penalize breaches of a community's business norms. It can be seen that there is some tension between these requirements and those highlighted by the previous approach, since both inside information and social control will tend to be maximized in rather conservative, static activities and regional economies. For innovation, the key features of trust relations are a confidence in the competence of collaborators to operate in an innovative environment, and absence of fear of reprisals after any reorganization of inter-firm relations. Tighter forms of social control than these are likely to be inimical to innovation (Rodriguez-Pose, 1999) . However, spatial clustering is neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion for the development of trust relations. Nor are all trust relations supportive of innovation. The result is that the relationship between innovation and trust relations appears rather ill-defined.
There are two important points to note about these various hypothetical approaches to explaining the spatial variations in innovation. Firstly, none of these hypotheses are specific about the spatial scale or scales at which key factors and processes operate. The relevant spatial scale at which to which to explain and plan for innovative activity may therefore vary greatly both between different types of activities and also between different kinds of spatial process which foster innovation. Secondly, there is no reason a priori why one hypothetical relationship should appear to be more prevalent or dominant than the others. It may be that different relationships may be more important in different circumstances. Within the industrial economics and international business literatures, most of the thinking on innovation has tended to be dominated by Hypotheses 1 and 2. On the other hand, within the recent management science, economic geography, and regional planning literatures, the overwhelming wisdom concerning the relationship between innovation and geography is dominated by Hypotheses 3 and 4. In particular, as was described in the introduction to this paper, there has been widespread support for Hypothesis 4 as being the emerging paradigm of geography-innovation relationships for the 21 st century (Castells and Hall, 1994; Saxenian, 1994) . Yet whether such hypotheses can actually be substantiated in practice is open to question.
The purpose of the following sections is to see which relationships between geography and innovation dominate in the case of the London region. As a precursor to our econometric analysis in Sections 6 and 7, in the next section we review the secondary evidence available on the relationship between geography and innovation across the wider London region, and in Section 5 we review the primary evidence available from the 1996 and 1999 London Employers' Surveys (LTC, 1997 (LTC, , 2000 .
Case study: innovation behaviour in the London region
As home to the UK's most obvious concentrations of innovative activities, together with many of the conditions expected to favour successful innovation, the London region provides an interesting case study of how these spatial factors may matter. The wider London region boasts the most highly qualified labour force, the best international links, the closest access to key decision-makers and elite discriminating consumers, the three premier research universities (London, Oxford, and Cambridge) , an array of key public sector research establishments, and an unrivalled agglomeration of specialist producer and cultural services. Unsurprisingly it is also an expensive region in which to do business, as a result directly or indirectly, of high space costs, and depends for its competitiveness on being able to offer products which are of distinctly higher quality or products which are not yet available elsewhere, whether because of their degree of specialization or their novelty. These generalizations apply at various different spatial scales, and most conspicuously in relation to the ten square miles or so of central London, but also across the Greater South East (GSE)-some 150 miles across, from Cambridgeshire in the north east, to Dorset in the south west, and around the south east coast-which was identified by Hall (1998) as the effective functional region for London. Within this broader region, there are a series of sub-regions (including Cambridge, Hertfordshire, and the Thames Valley-M4 corridor) which display some of the characteristics in a heightened form, though with rather more limited local accumulations of skills, information sources and services than central London.
If we take as a measure of innovative performance the proportion of businesses claiming (in the European Union's 1996 Community Innovation Survey) to have introduced new products or services in the previous three years, it is the broad GSE region outside of London itself, which displays the strongest incidence of innovation. London's own performance is around the national and European averages, but that in several other parts of the region is conspicuously higher. Moreover, this finding applies to both manufacturing and service activities. In the first case, 12 of the 14 counties of the region figure among the top 25 in the UK. The top eight include the seven contiguous counties in the north and west of the GSE with between 68 and 80% of the sampled firms claiming new products, compared with 51% in London and 59% for the UK as a whole (Simmie and Sennett, 1999) . For manufacturing, the pattern of intra-regional variation broadly reflects the locational distribution of the more innovative sectors. For services this is less obviously the case. In the case of services, where the differences are less striking and the sample less good, eight of the GSE counties appear among the top 12. However, in this case the strong performers include several of the south coast counties, and are therefore distributed more randomly around the region. This general picture of a dispersed hinterland of innovative centres has also been confirmed by observations of other innovative cities such as Paris and Stuttgart (Simmie, 2001 ).
This empirical evidence provides us with our first general observation concerning the geography of innovation across the London region.
Observation 1: In the case of the London region, the empirical evidence suggests that innovation is not primarily constrained to the core urban area, but appears to be distributed across the hinterland areas of the dominant urban centre.
For the UK, this observation tends to refute Hypothesis 2 in Section 3, and this regional, rather than specifically urban, pattern of innovation may reflect combinations of several factors. One of these is that several of the key assets are themselves regionalized, rather than being heavily concentrated in the urban core. For example much of the region's highly qualified labour pool actually lives in London's commuter hinterland, especially on the western side of the city, while most of the significant public sector research establishments are also found in this part of the region (and few actually within Greater London). The accessible commuter pool is maximized from sites within central London close to mainline termini (as may be true of other regionalized assets) but outside this prime rent area London's advantages are less clear-cut, and second-best sites may well be found within the commuter ring. Access to international air services-principally through Heathrow airport on the western boundary of Greater London, and secondarily through Gatwick in the south of the outer metropolitan ring-is also better from much of this 'western crescent' area than from most of Greater London. Even for those people and firms not based there, central London remains a natural meeting ground, and a key location for exchange (and interpretation) of intelligence from national and international networks. But for locational decision-making or the establishment of competitive advantage, a crucial consideration is the frequency with which staff need to be involved on a faceto-face basis in such interaction, and the trade-off between time spent in the required travel and the space/congestion costs associated with central locations. Clearly this varies greatly between different kinds of innovative activity, depending on the range of contacts on which they draw and the rhythm of their innovation/development cycles. However, very few other sectors have the same need for the type of up-to-the minute intelligence required for financial market operations, or the sheer frequency of meetings with external national-level (or foreign) contacts which are essential in much of the producer service or political activities. For many innovative activities which are heavily dependent on agglomeration economies, regional locations are therefore likely to be the preferred options. In addition, there is the possibility that more local externalities may be achieved through clustering of related kinds of business at a sub-regional scale.
Drawing on a number of studies of innovation in the London region by Simmie and colleagues and parallel work in the Paris and other European regions (Simmie, 2001 ), Simmie and Sennett (1999) suggest that leading regions such as the wider London region are characterized by 'multiple clusters of innovative sectors, mostly low levels of linkages with local suppliers and customers, the importance of national and international markets, critical infrastructure such as international hub airports, large size and high concentrations of competitive innovation' (p.89). This picture was confirmed with a survey of innovative firms' reasons for location within the wider London region in which the highest importance was given to traditional agglomeration economies, notably general issues of accessibility, premises and the availability of professional labour, with secondary importance being given to local industrial knowledge, experience, and suppliers. They conclude that innovative firms in such regions are gathered there together 'not so much because they need or use strong intra-industry networks or linkages, but rather because they are making use of the multiple 'pick and mix' possibilities provided by the urbanization effects of large urban agglomerations' (p.92).
These various explanations for the reasons why the wider London region is a leading area of innovation are broadly in line with the standard Marshallian (Marshall, 1920) arguments in favour of the agglomeration advantages of major industrial centres (Gordon and McCann, 2000) . Therefore, this evidence provides us with our second observation concerning the geographical nature of innovation behaviour in the London region:
Observation 2: In the case of London, innovation advantages can be explained largely in terms orthodox agglomeration effects.
This observation appears to provide support for Hypothesis 3 in Section 3, in that it suggests that in the case of the London region, the geography of innovation in these major urban regions can be understood primarily in terms of orthodox explanations of agglomeration economies, without recourse to these various stylized constructs.
In this section, our review of the secondary empirical evidence available suggests that innovation in the wider London region is associated with Hypothesis 3. In other words innovation appears to associated with agglomeration economies. Further evidence on this issue can be gleaned from a basic analysis of the 1996 and 1999 London Employers' Surveys.
Empirical analysis of innovation within metropolitan London: evidence from the 1996 London employers' surveys
Within Greater London itself, a substantial amount of data on innovative activities and their characteristics is available from the 1996 and 1999 rounds of the London Employer Survey (LTC, 1997 (LTC, , 2000 . 6 Overall in the 1996 survey, which provides the fullest information, 47% of private business establishments claimed to have significantly extended or developed their products and services during the past two years, and 35% claimed to have significantly developed their processes. But in both cases innovation was much more likely among larger businesses, so the two kinds of innovating establishments accounted for 58% and 50% respectively, of private sector employment in London. Within these innovating firms we may make a rough distinction between leaders and followers on the basis of firms' judgements about where they stood in relation to major competitors after their innovation. For both product and process innovation, a rather small proportion (around 5%) thought they were still left behind by some major competitors, with most either feeling that they had kept pace, or had achieved a moderate or powerful competitive advantage. On this basis, from Table 1 we see that among product innovators, the leaders appear to be significantly larger than the followers, while London seems to have a rather larger share of leaders in product than in process terms, accounting for 57% and 52% respectively of jobs in innovating establishments. Among those establishments which have not innovated, between a third and a half did not believe this was important for companies in their line of business. For process innovations in particular, those who recognized their importance but had made none recently tended to be smaller, single site, single or family-owned businesses.
Taking firms' perceptions of the rate at which the overall market to which they catered was growing or declining as a proxy for position in the product or profit lifecycle, it is clear that the innovative behaviour in London is associated with the early phases of that cycle. For both product and process innovations, we see from Table 2 that a higher proportion of firms engage in innovative activities in expanding markets than in stable or declining markets. Moreover, in expanding markets there is a much higher proportion of leaders than followers, the proportion of which appears to be largely invariant with the market environment. This is particularly true for product innovators, and especially for leaders 34% of whom were in the phase of the cycle with rapid market growth. Yet, contradicting Utterback and Abernathy's (1975) hypothesis, it is also the case for process innovators. This did not, however, entail a particularly strong concentration of innovation among the most recently established enterprises in that the overall rate of product innovation was actually below average for firms founded in the previous two years, while three quarters of the leader establishments were from firms which were over ten years old. This empirical evidence from the 1996 London Employers' Survey therefore provides us with our third empirical observation concerning the nature of innovation:
Observation 3: While innovation within the urban area is associated with early stages of the product or profit life-cycle, innovation appears to be more associated with larger and older firms rather than newer firms.
This observation is broadly consistent with an Alchian (1957) framework. Observations 2 and 3 might also suggest tentative support for a Vernon-type framework. However, the latter has already been ruled out by Observation 1. Importantly, however, our findings clearly rule out Hypothesis 4. As such, our findings and observations appear to be at odds with most of assumptions underlying the clustering, innovative milieux, or new industrial areas literatures.
In terms of sectoral differences, within London the highest rates of product innovation in 1996 were reported in printing/publishing, information/communications technologies (ICT), and recreational/cultural services, while process innovation was most common in City financial services 7 , and ICT. Focusing solely on the 'leaders' (i.e. those claiming some competitive advantage after their innovation), ICT retains its position in respect of product innovation, although 'followers' predominated among the innovators in recreation/cultural services. Manufacturing as a whole, wholesale distribution, non-air transport, City financial services, and (private) health care also had above average proportions of 'leaders'. In relation to process innovations, the above average performers were printing/publishing, air transport, City financial services, and ICT. Some significant spatial variations were also evident within London, with around 60-65% of jobs in parts of inner London (outside of the central area) and in the outer west (around Heathrow) accounted for by innovating businesses (including 40-45% in 'leaders'), while in the outer east and centre the proportions were somewhat lower, with around 50% overall, and 20% for the leaders, respectively.
For product innovations in particular, the strength of relations with both suppliers and customers was a significant factor favouring innovation. Among London firms, however, the probability of such links is not at all increased by having more local customers or suppliers. Nor is it the case overall that those businesses perceiving any kind of advantage in locating close to related businesses 8 are any more likely to innovate, either in products or processes.
The evidence from the 1996 London Employers' Survey therefore provides us with our fourth empirical observation concerning the nature of innovation:
Observation 4: Within an urban area, the innovation advantages of an urban location appear to be explained largely in terms orthodox agglomeration effects, although the evidence points more to the influence of urbanization, rather than localization effects.
This observation appears to provide support for Hypothesis 3.
7 As distinct from the more routine operations elsewhere in London. 8 These are actually a rather small minority among London businesses (Gordon and McCann, 2000) .
Regarding the various possible relationships between geography and innovation, the empirical evidence presented here in Sections 4 and 5 provides broad support for Hypothesis 3, while finding no evidence for Hypotheses 1, 2 or 4. Agglomeration economies appear to provide the best explanation of the London and South east of England geography of innovation. As such, these observations appear to cast doubt on the significance of much of the clustering, innovative milieux or new industrial areas literatures, at least as far as the UK is concerned.
The only spatial issue on which the simple agglomeration model McCann, 2000, 2004) would need to be modified is in terms of the critical spatial dimensions over which such agglomeration advantages to innovation appear to operate. Whereas a strict interpretation of urban economics would define the critical spatial area over which agglomeration externalities would operate as being the metropolitan urban area, it appears from Observation 1 that the innovation benefits of agglomeration may be rather more dispersed around the urban hinterland regions of London.
Multinomial logit analysis of innovation within London
The evidence presented so far based on our aggregate empirical data provides broad support for Hypotheses 3, and tends to refute Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. However, in order to further investigate these issues we conduct some micro-econometric analyses on a sample of London firms. The key results from the two surveys are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 which include only the variables with a significant influence on the distribution of establishments between leader, follower and non-innovator status (for products or processes) when other influences are controlled for. Multivariate logit analyses of the probabilities of innovation using results from the 1999 survey (Table 3) showed a range of statistically significant influences, including (in rough order of importance): 9 industrial sector: after controlling for other influences, innovation is significantly less likely in construction, hotels, land transport, real estate, and (non IT) business services, while IT and publishing are the most significant innovating sectors; establishment size: innovation is substantially more likely in larger than small or medium sized establishments; stage in the product life cycle: innovation was most likely in the first phase (strong growth) and least likely in the last three (stability or decline); market area: innovation is substantially less likely among businesses whose main market is local to London districts, and more likely among those primarily serving national or European markets; establishment role: innovation was most common at the main site of multiplant concerns and least at branches of firms based elsewhere in the UK; ownership: innovation was substantially more likely in establishments owned by limited companies than in individually or partnership-owned businesses; occupational mix: innovation was more likely in establishments with a higher proportion of professional, managerial and (especially) sales staff; area: after controlling for other factors, spatial differences remain, with the pattern now one of significantly higher rates in the south west (in areas lying between the CBD and Heathrow airport) and lower in the centre and the east side of London; business age: older firms tend to be somewhat less innovative, though innovation is not strongly concentrated among recently established firms. Notes: 1. Included categorical variables and covariates all selected on the basis of significance at 5% level; 2. Significance levels for individual variables or categories * ¼ 10%; ** ¼ 1%; *** ¼ 0.1%; 3. Coefficients recorded for the categorical variables represent proportionate effects on the odds of innovating (as leader or follower); for the two logged variables they represent 1.0 plus the elasticity of these odds with respect to establishment age or employment numbers (respectively) ; for the occupational shares they represent the effect on the odds if all (rather than no) workers were in the occupational group concerned. 4. South West London here comprises the boroughs of Hounslow, Richmond, Kingston, Ealing, Merton, Wandsworth, and Lambeth.
Similar analyses using the 1996 survey (Table 4) , which offers a quite different set of independent variables, highlight additional links between innovation and: company commitment to strong growth; strategically significant links with customers, suppliers and (through joint ventures) also with collaborators; emphasizing design, specification, and presentation, rather than price, fast response, or image/reputation as selling points. Notes: see Table 4 , notes 1 to 3.
Additional information from the surveys indicates that the methods used by innovating firms to develop their new products and services fell into three natural groups:
1. external advice and observation, including observation of other firms, externally commissioned advice, work undertaken with partner firms, and design assistance from suppliers and/or major customers; 2. formal or informal design/creativity from within the establishment; and 3. formal or informal design/creativity from other company sites.
The number of methods in the first two categories used by businesses was related to the importance which they attached to innovation. In addition, the use of internal development procedures was positively related to the size of establishment, while the use of resources elsewhere in the company was naturally excluded for single plant sites, and most common for branches of foreign firms.
Moreover, in relation to the outcomes of innovation, in terms of whether establishments secured a competitive advantage or just kept up, the use of creative inputs from other company sites increased the likelihood of a leader position, while reliance on observations of other firms was more associated with a follower status. Making use of the more leader-oriented methods of innovation was associated with multi-plant enterprises (particularly foreign-owned firms), and also associated with being involved in joint ventures (irrespective of where the partners were located).
Putting the London region in a national context
Size effects indicated from analyses of such binary measures-innovating or not, within a specific period-might be spurious, in so far as larger (and older) businesses will typically have a larger stock of distinct products and processes, with an inherently greater chance of at least one being introduced, replaced, or upgraded during any given time interval, even if long run rates of innovation are identical. The significance of such biases can be assessed for product innovation at least from the CSME surveys 10 by comparison of the binary indicator with others based on the proportion of sales accounted for by unchanged, improved, or novel products-though the sample of these surveys excludes any firms with more than 500 employees at the time of the first wave. As a test, we took nation-wide data from the 1997 wave, and carried out multinomial logistic analyses regressing two binary indicators of product innovation (for products 'new to the firm' and those 'new to the industry'), on the shares of new and of improved products, together with terms interacting these with business age and a lagged measure of employment, both expressed in logged terms. The results, presented in Table 5 show that both of the continuous measures of innovation-intensiveness of products are related to both of the binary indicators of product innovation-and that there is no evidence at all of interactions between either indicator and the age or size of business. Hence we conclude that the size effects found for binary measures of product innovation in the London Employers' Survey are likely to be quite genuine, and not the result of inherent biases in these indicators.
Though intentionally focused on relatively small firms, the CSME surveys also offer valuable comparative evidence on spatial variations in factors related to firms' innovative behaviour, as Athreye and Keeble (2002a,b) have demonstrated with data from the 1995 round. In particular, they have exploited a comparison between firms in the South East region, and those in more industrial regions of the midlands and north to suggest how agglomeration may condition the processes through which technology is acquired and transferred. They argue that the emergence of specialized intermediate service markets in the larger and more competitive South Eastern economy leads to innovating firms there relying more on market modes of selling and acquiring technology. More specifically, firms in the South East tended mostly to buy rights to use other firms' or organizations' technologies, whereas those in the Industrial Heartland made greater use of bought in R&D and consultancy services, and interaction with their suppliers, representing an embodied form of innovation acquisition, in the context of a less developed specialized services market (Athreye and Keeble, 2002a) , Two other differences, consistent with this explanatory framework, were that in the Industrial Heartland firms made greater use of local Chambers of Commerce as a source for innovation (Athreye and Keeble, 2002a) , and that local concentrations of public R&D activity seemed to have a stronger positive effect on firms innovative behaviour there than in the South East (Athreye and Keeble, 2002b) . The suggestion is that innovative capacity among small and medium-sized enterprises in the Industrial Heartland is weakened by the lack of comparable commercial externalities to those available in the South East. There are some question marks about their statistical evidence, however. As far as the processes employed by firms in the two regions are concerned (Athreye and Keeble, 2002a) , this basically involves the comparison of average values which (as the authors recognize) may be affected as much by differences in sectoral mix as by purely regional factors. In the logit analyses of influences on individual firms' innovative behaviour (Athreye and Keeble, 2002b) , the only conventionally significant difference between the regions seems to be a much greater innovativeness of electrical/electronic firms in the Industrial Heartland.
In search of clearer evidence we have therefore turned to some further analyses, using the 1997 wave of the CSME survey. In the first case we carried out a series of analyses of variance/co-variance, relating indicators of firms' behaviour and attitudes not only to regional/urban location, but also to a set of control variables including industrial sector (21 in all), business size (logged numbers of employees), age (logged), and its number of sites (again logged). In the great majority of cases this failed to reveal any significant differences associated with regional location (here defined in terms of the Greater South East versus the rest of Great Britain) or urbanity (four categories of settlement from conurbation to small town). The only clear exceptions were firms' use of three noncommercial sources of communication-higher education, professional conferences, journals and meetings; and government/private research institutes-all given significantly more importance by firms in the smaller settlements.
11 As far as the broad regional comparison is concerned, the only possibly significant difference was that firms in the Greater South East actually gave greater weight to sources within their corporate group (where relevant).
12 What seems notable, however, is the lack of evidence that the role of contact with customers, suppliers, competitors, or consultants-all of which might have been expected to be more important in bigger agglomerations-actually varies on either of the spatial dimensions we have distinguished. Similarly, in terms of reported limitations on innovation, there are only three instances of variations on these dimensions in firms' reports of importance-all involve firms in smaller settlements, who report more difficulty in accessing required technologies or premises and in the adequacy of market demand.
13
In fact, there is no evidence from this survey of levels of innovation among small and medium sized businesses varying systematically over either of these spatial dimensionsi.e. between the Greater South East and the rest or between larger and smaller settlements-when industry, size, age, and branches are controlled for. This is true, whether innovation is measured in terms of product or process, developments new to the industry or just the firm, instances of innovation, or the share of improved/novel products in sales. Hence it is unsurprising that when further explanatory variables are introduced in regression models with these as dependent variables-for example the firm's own R&D activity, the strength of its links with overseas suppliers, or other examples of partnership-that the spatial variables remain insignificant. Testing for possible interactions between any of these indicators and one or other of the two spatial variables also yielded entirely negative results. Thus there was no evidence, for example, of one sector or size of SME firm doing systematically better inside or outside the Greater South East, or in smaller or larger settlements.
11 At or close to the 1% significance level in each case. 12 At the 5% significance level. 13 All at the 3-4% significance level.
Conclusions
The primary and secondary empirical evidence presented here in this paper support the argument that agglomeration economies provide the best explanation of the innovation dynamics in London and the South east of England. We find that innovative behaviour in London seems to have rather little to do with the strong local inter-business connections highlighted in the co-operative, social network versions of the milieu literature. As such, there appears to be no empirical support for arguments relating to much of the clustering, innovative milieux or new industrial areas literatures, at least as far as the UK is concerned.
Elsewhere, we have shown that, with the notable exception of City financial services requiring rapid access to shared market intelligence, only a small minority of London businesses perceive significant advantages in being located near to related activities, with even fewer perceiving networking opportunities as the source of any such advantage (Gordon and McCann, 2000) . This turns out to be as true of innovating activities as of others, with no particular link to the perceived advantages of clustering, and no evident effects from having more local regional markets, suppliers, or partners. The only possible exception is in relation to joint ventures which are associated with a greater likelihood of product innovation in a leader role. This effect is just as strong when partners are distant as when they are close, 14 but London firms do seem rather more likely (than numbers alone would warrant) to form joint ventures with other London or South East-based firms. An implication of this 'distance deterrence' effect is that businesses in the agglomeration may be rather more likely to form joint ventures, but the difference may not be great, given that two thirds of the joint ventures are still with firms based outside London.
A second related feature of innovative behaviour in London is the role of business scale and organization, with clear evidence that, even in a conurbation offering the highest level of external economies, the propensity to innovate (especially in a leader role) is positively associated with internal scale factors. Moreover, this pattern is not simply due to differences in sectoral mix or market-localization between smaller and larger businesses. As such, it is rather contrary to the emphasis of much recent academic and policy writing about the geography of innovation, which focuses on the particular locational and network requirements of recently established, small enterprises, as a key source of dynamism for regional economies. The point may be that such firms face particular difficulties in successfully pursuing innovative strategies, which may perhaps be reduced in cities and regions where agglomeration economies or open networks allow more of the support facilities and uncertainties to be externalized. In that case, the bias of innovation towards larger businesses could well be stronger elsewhere, but the simple fact is that innovating enterprises in London do tend to be significantly larger than average.
In order to draw our final conclusion, we can adopt the classification of industrial clusters identified by McCann (2000, 2004) on the basis of inter-firm relations and transactions. On the basis of this classification, the variety of evidence presented here suggests that innovating businesses appear to derive benefits from a London location in a diffuse and flexible manner implied by models of pure agglomeration applied at the wider regional level, rather than through the more specific and stable links McCann, 2000, 2004) highlighted in the social network model. This finding accords with our previous findings for London firms in general (Gordon and McCann, 2000) -and also with Grabher's (2001) conclusion for the particular case of London advertising firms, which stresses adaptability, rivalry, and the significance (for learning) of latent networks in a context marked by short-termism.
